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Abstract
Multi-context systems (MCS) presented by Brewka and Eiter can be
considered as a promising way to interlink decentralized and heteroge-
neous knowledge contexts. In this paper, we propose preferential multi-
context systems (PMCS), which provide a framework for incorporating
a total preorder relation over contexts in a multi-context system. In a
given PMCS, its contexts are divided into several parts according to the
total preorder relation over them, moreover, only information flows from
a context to ones of the same part or less preferred parts are allowed to
occur. As such, the first l preferred parts of an PMCS always fully cap-
ture the information exchange between contexts of these parts, and then
compose another meaningful PMCS, termed the l-section of that PMCS.
We generalize the equilibrium semantics for an MCS to the (maximal)
l≤-equilibrium which represents belief states at least acceptable for the l-
section of an PMCS. We also investigate inconsistency analysis in PMCS
and related computational complexity issues.
Keywords : Preferential multi-context systems, equilibrium, inconsistency
diagnosis, inconsistency explanation, maximal consistent section
1 Introduction
Many (if not all) real-world applications of sharing and reasoning knowledge
are characterized by heterogeneous contexts, especially with the advent of the
world wide web. Research in representing contexts and information flow between
contexts has gained much attention recently in artificial intelligence [11, 4, 7,
8, 5, 13] as well as in applications such as requirements engineering [10, 15, 14].
Instead of finding a universal knowledge representation for all contexts, it
has been increasingly recognized that it may be desirable to allow each context
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to choose a suitable representation tool for its own to capture its knowledge
precisely. For example, in some frameworks such as Viewpionts for eliciting and
analyzing software requirements developers often encourage stakeholders to use
their own familiar terms and notations to express their demands so as to elicit
requirements as full as possible [10, 15]. Moreover, the heterogeneous nature of
contexts representations may allow different monotonic or non-monotonic rea-
soning mechanisms to occur together in a given system. For example, as stated
in [4], there is growing interest in combining ontologies based on description
logics with non-monotonic formalisms in semantic web applications. However,
the diversity of representations of contexts in such cases brings some important
challenges to accessing each individual context as well as to interlinking these
contexts [5].
Nonmonotonic multi-context systems presented by Brewka and Eiter [4] can
be considered as a promising way to deal with these challenges [5]. Instead of
attempting to translate all contexts with different formalisms into a unifying
formalism, they leave the logics of contexts untouched and interlink contexts by
modeling the inter-contextual information exchange in a uniform way. To be
more precise, information flow among contexts is articulated by so-called bridge
rules in a declarative way. Similar to logical programming rules, each bridge rule
consists of two parts, the head of the rule and the body of the rule (possibly
empty). More importantly, each bridge rule allows access to other contexts in
its body. This makes it capable of adding information represented by its head to
a context by exchanging information with other contexts. In semantics, several
equilibria representing acceptable belief states for multi-context systems are also
given by Brewka and Eiter [4].
Multi-context systems can be viewed as the first step towards interlinking
distributed and heterogeneous contexts effectively. The way they operating
contextual knowledge bases is only limited to adding information to a context
when the corresponding bridge rules are applicable [5]. To be more applicable to
real-world applications, it is advisable to generalize multi-context systems from
some perspectives. For example, Brewka et al have considerably generalized
multi-context systems to managed multi-context systems (mMCS) by allowing
flexible operations on context knowledge bases [5]. Essentially, managed multi-
context systems focus on managed contexts, which are contexts together with
possible operations on them.
Combining preferences and contexts is still an interesting issue in reasoning
about contextual knowledge [3]. In particular, preferences on contexts have
an important influence on information exchange between contexts and inter-
contextual knowledge integration in many real-world applications. For example,
it is intuitive to revise a less reliable knowledge base by accessing more reliable
ones. But we cannot use information deriving from less reliable sources to revise
more reliable knowledge bases in general case. In legal reasoning, consequences
of applying a law to a case can be rebutted by that of applying another law
with higher level when there is a conflict, and not vise versa. In such cases, it
may be advisable to take into account preferences on contexts in characterizing
inter-contextual information exchange in multi-context systems.
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Moreover, taking into account the preference relation on contexts makes
some subsets of more preferred contexts satisfying some given constraints more
significant when the whole set of contexts does not satisfy the constraints. For
example, in a multi-party negotiation, an agreement between the most impor-
tant parties is preferred if it is difficult to achieve an agreement between all
parties in many cases. In an incremental software development, only require-
ments with priorities higher than a given level are concerns of developers at a
given stage.
To address these issues, we combine a multi-context system with a total
preorder relation on its contexts to develop a preferential multi-context system
(PMCS) in this paper. A preferential multi-context systems is given in the form
of a sequence of sets of contexts such that the location of a set signifies its
preference level. Without loss of generality, we assume that the smaller of the
location of a set is, the more preferred contexts in that set are. We call each set
of contexts in that sequence a stratum. Moreover, we assume that information
flow cannot be from less preferred strata to more preferred ones. That is, any
bridge rule of a given context does not allow any access to other strictly less
preferred contexts in its body. As such, the first several strata also compose a
new preferential multi-context system such that all the contexts involved in it are
strictly more preferred than ones out of it. We call such a new preferential multi-
context system a section of that system. We are interested in all sections as well
as the whole preferential multi-context system, and then propose l≤-equilibria
to represent belief sets acceptable for at least contexts in the first l strata. In
particular, the maximal consistent section describes a maximal section that has
an equilibrium. Actually, it plays an important role in inconsistency analysis
in a given preferential multi-context system, because it can be considered as
maximally reliable part of that preferential multi-context system. We are more
interested in finding diagnoses and inconsistency explanations compatible with
maximal consistent section instead of all ones. Finally, we discuss computational
complexity issues.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give a brief introduction to
multi-context systems in Section 2. We propose preferential multi-context sys-
tems in Section 3. In section 4, we discuss inconsistency analysis in preferential
multi-context systems. We discuss complexity issues in Section 5. In section 6
we compare our work with some closely related work. Finally we conclude this
paper in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review the details of the definitions of multi-context systems
presented by Brewka and Eiter [4] and inconsistency analysis in multi-context
systems presented in [8]. The material is largely taken from [4] and [8].
The goal of multi-context systems is to combine arbitrary monotonic and
nonmonotonic logics. Here a logic L is referred to as a triple (KBL, BSL, ACCL),
where KBL is the set of well-formed knowledge bases of L, which characterizes
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the syntax of L; BSL is the set of belief sets; and ACCL : KBL → 2BSL is a
function describing the semantics of the logic by assign to each knowledge base
(a set of formulas) a set of acceptable sets of beliefs [4].
Definition 2.1 [4] Let L = {L1, L2, · · · , Ln} be a set of logics. A Lk-bridge
rule over L, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, is of the form
(k : s)← (r1 : p1), · · · , (rj : pj),not (rj+1 : pj+1), · · · ,not (rm : pm)
where 1 ≤ rl ≤ n, pl is an element of some belief set of Lrl , and for each
kb ∈ KBLk, kb ∪ {s} ∈ KBLk .
Similar to logical programming rules, we call the left (resp. right) part of r
the head (resp. body) of the bridge rule r.
Definition 2.2 [4] A multi-context system M = (C1, C2, · · · , Cn) consists of
a collection of contexts Ci = (Li, kbi, bri), where Li = (KBi, BSi, ACCi) is a
logic, kbi ∈ KBi is a knowledge base, and bri is a set of Li-bridge rules over
{L1, L2, · · · , Ln}.
A multi-context system M is finite if all knowledge bases kbi and sets of
bridge rules bri are finite [4].
Given a Lk-bridge rule r, we use hd(r) to denote the head of r. Further,
let cnt+(r) = {Cri |1 ≤ i ≤ j} and cnt
−(r) = {Cri |j + 1 ≤ i ≤ m}. Obviously,
cnt(r) = cnt+(r) ∪ cnt−(r) is exactly the set of contexts involved in the body
of r.
We use brM to denote the set of all bridge rules in M , i.e, brM = ∪
n
i=1bri.
For any set D ⊆ brM , we use heads(D) to denote the set of all the rules in D
in unconditional form, i.e., heads(D) = {hd(r) ← | r ∈ D}. Let R be a set
of bridge rules, we use M [R] to denote the MCS obtained from M by replacing
brM with R. For a set R of sets of bridge rules, we use
⋃
R to denote the union
of all sets in R.
A belief state for M = (C1, C2, · · · , Cn) is a sequence S = (S1, S2, · · · , Sn)
such that each Si ∈ BSi. A bridge rule r is applicable in a belief state S =
(S1, S2, · · · , Sn) iff for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, pi ∈ Sri and for j + 1 ≤ l ≤ m, pk 6∈ Srl .
We use app(bri, S) to denote the set of all Li-bridge rules that are applicable in
belief state S.
Definition 2.3 [4] A belief state S = (S1, S2, · · · , Sn) of M is an equilibrium
iff, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Si ∈ ACCi(kbi ∪ {head(r)|r ∈ app(bri, S)}).
Essentially, an equilibrium is a belief state which contains an acceptable
belief set for each context, given the belief sets for other contexts [4].
Example 2.1 Let M0 = (C1, C2, C3) be an MCS, where L1 is a propositional
logic, whilst both L2 and L3 are ASP logics. Suppose that
• kb1 = {a, b}, br1 = {(1 : c)← (2 : d), (3 : g)};
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• kb2 = {d← e, e← d}, br2 = {(2 : p)← (1 : c),not (3 : h)};
• kb3 = {f ← g, g ←}, br3 = {(3 : q) ← (2 : p), (1 : a); (3 : h) ← not (1 :
c)}.
Consider S = ({a, b, c}, {d, e, p}, {f, g, q}). Note that all bridge rules are
applicable in S, except (3 : h)← not (1 : c).
Evidently, we can check S is an equilibrium of M0.
Note that it cannot be guaranteed that there exists an equilibrium for a
given multi-context system. Inconsistency in an MCS is referred to as the lack
of an equilibrium [8]. We use M |= ⊥ to denote that M is inconsistent, i.e., has
no equilibrium. In this paper, we assume that every context to be consistent if
no bridge rules apply, i.e., M [∅] 6|= ⊥.
Example 2.2 Let M1 = (C1, C2, C3) be an MCS, where L1 is a propositional
logic, whilst both L2 and L3 are ASP logics. Suppose that
• kb1 = {a, b}, br1 = {r1 = (1 : c)← (2 : e)};
• kb2 = {d← e, e←}, br2 = {r2 = (2 : p)← (1 : c)};
• kb3 = {g ←,⊥ ← q,not h}, br3 = {r3 = (3 : q) ← (2 : p); r4 = (3 : h) ←
not (1 : a)}.
Note that all bridge rules are applicable, except r4. The three applicable
bridge rules in turn adds q to C3, and then activates ⊥ ← q,not h. So, M1 has
no equilibrium, i.e., M1 |= ⊥.
To analyze inconsistency, inspired by debugging approaches used in the non-
monotonic reasoning community, T. Eiter et al have introduced two notions
of explaining inconsistency, i.e., diagnoses and inconsistency explanations for
multi-context systems [8]. Roughly speaking, diagnoses provide a consistency-
based formulation for explaining inconsistency, by finding a part of bridge rules
which need to be changed (deactivated or added in unconditional form) to re-
store consistency in a multi-context system, whilst inconsistency explanations
provide an entailment-based formulation for inconsistency, by identifying a part
of bridge rules which is needed to cause inconsistency [8].
Definition 2.4 [8] Given an MCS M , a diagnosis of M is a pair (D1, D2),
D1, D2 ⊆ brM , s.t. M [brM \ D1 ∪ heads(D2)] 6|= ⊥. D
±(M) is the set of all
such diagnosis.
Essentially, a diagnosis exactly captures a pair of sets of bridge rules such
that inconsistency will disappear if we deactivate the rules in the first set, and
add the rules in the second set in unconditional form [8].
Definition 2.5 [8] D±m(M) is the set of all pointwise subset-minimal diagnoses
of an MCS M , where the pointwise subset relation (D1, D2) ⊆ (D
′
1, D
′
2) holds
iff D1 ⊆ D′1 and D2 ⊆ D
′
2.
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Example 2.3 Consider M1 again. Then
D±m(M1) = {({r1}, ∅), ({r2}, ∅), ({r3}, ∅), (∅, {r4})}.
This means we need only to deactivate one of r1, r2, and r3, or to add r4
unconditionally, in order to restore consistency for M1.
Definition 2.6 [8] Given an MCS M , an inconsistency explanation of M is
a pair (E1, E2) of sets E1, E2 ∈ brM of bridge rules s.t. for all (R1, R2) where
E1 ⊆ R1 ⊆ brM and R2 ⊆ brM \ E2, it holds that M [R1 ∪ heads(R2)] |= ⊥.
By E±(M) we denote the set of all inconsistency explanations of M , and by
E±m(M) the set of all pointwise subset-minimal ones.
Essentially, an inconsistency explanation captures a pair of sets of bridge
rules such that the rules in the first set cause an inconsistency relevant to the
MCS, and this inconsistency cannot be resolved by adding bridge rules uncon-
ditionally, unless we use at least one bridge rule in the second set [8].
Example 2.4 Consider M1 again. Then
E±m(M1) = {({r1, r2, r3}, {r4})}.
This means that the inconsistency in M1 is caused by r1, r2, and r3 together,
moreover, it can be resolved by adding r4 unconditionally.
Note that both addition and removal of knowledge can prevent inconsistency
in nonmonotonic reasoning. So, a diagnosis consists of two sets of bridge rules
including the set of bridge rules to be removed and that to be added uncondi-
tionally. As pointed out in [8], for scenarios where removal of bridge rules is
preferred to unconditional addition of rules, we may focus on diagnoses of the
form (D1, ∅) only.
Definition 2.7 [8] Given an MCS M , an s-diagnosis of M is a set D ⊆ brM
s.t. M [brM \D] 6|= ⊥. The set of all s-diagnoses (resp., ⊆-minimal s-diagnoses)
is D−(M) (resp., D−m(M)).
Similarly, we need only focus on inconsistency explanations in form of (E1, brM )
if adding rules unconditionally is less preferred.
Definition 2.8 [8] Given an MCS M , an s-inconsistency explanation of M
is a set E ⊆ brM s.t. each R where E ⊆ R ⊆ brM , satisfies M [R] |= ⊥.
The set of all s-inconsistency explanations (resp., ⊆-minimal s-inconsistency
explanations) is E+(M) (resp., E+m(M)).
Example 2.5 Consider M1 again. Then
D−m(M1) = {{r1}, {r2}, {r3}}, E
+
m(M1) = {{r1, r2, r3}}.
More interestingly, Eiter et al have obtained the following duality relation
between diagnoses and inconsistency explanations:
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Theorem 2.1 [8] Given an inconsistent MCS M ,
⋃
D±m(M) =
⋃
E±m(M),
and ⋃
D−m(M) =
⋃
E+m(M).
This duality theorem shows that the unions of all minimal diagnoses and all
inconsistency explanations coincide, i.e., diagnoses and inconsistency explana-
tions represent dual aspects of inconsistency in an MCS [8].
3 Preferential Multi-context Systems
In this section we formally introduce a class of MCSs that allows us to consider
preference information on contexts, called preferential multi-context systems, or
simply PMCSs. As explained in the introduction, the motivation for such MCSs
is that in many practical applications, it is often the case that some context has
higher priority over another context. For example, the ontology SNOWMED
CT (a context) will have higher priority over Wikipedia (another context) for
medical doctors. In the setting of MCSs, an PMCS P is a pair (M,≤s) such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) M is an MCS that has a splitting M = ∪mi=1Mi.
(2) ≤s is a total preorder1 on the set {M1, . . . ,Mm}.
Recall thatM = ∪mi=1Mi is a splitting forM ifMi 6= ∅ for all i andMi∩Mj =
∅ for all i 6= j.
Informally, Mi ≤s Mj means that a context C in Mi is always preferred to
a context C′ in Mj . We assume that the smaller a subscript i is , the more
preferredMi is. Then we use 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 instead of {M1, . . . ,Mm} from now
on.
In an PMCS, preference information controls the information flow from one
context to another context. Specifically, a context can be impacted only by
more or equally preferred ones. This notion is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 Let ≤s be a total preorder relation on the set of contexts M =
〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉.
(1) The set brl of bridge rules of Cl ∈ Mi is compatible with the preorder
relation ≤s on M if for all r ∈ brl, cnt(r) ∩Mj = ∅ for all j > i.
1 A binary relation ≤ on some set A is a total preorder relation if it is reflexive, transitive,
and total, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ A, we have that:
(1) a ≤ a (reflexivity),
(2) if a ≤ b and b ≤ c, then a ≤ c (transitivity),
(3) a ≤ b or b ≤ a (totality).
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(2) The set brM of bridge rules of M is compatible with the preorder relation
≤s on M if bri is compatible with ≤s for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Essentially, the compatibility of brl with ≤s implies that only information
exchange between Cl with some Cks satisfying Ck ≤ Cl for each k may activate
possible change of kbl in Cl.
Given an MCS M and a total preorder relation ≤s on contexts in M , we say
that M is compatible with ≤s iff brM is compatible with ≤s.
Definition 3.2 (Preferential multi-context system) A preferential multi-
context system (PMCS) is a pair (M,≤s), where M is an MCS, and ≤s is a
total preorder relation on contexts in M such that M is compatible with ≤s.
An PMCS (M,≤s) is represented in the form of a sequence 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉
such that for Ci, Cj ∈ M , Ci ≤s Cj iff for some ti, tj : Ci ∈ Mti , Cj ∈ Mtj and
ti ≤ tj . In particular, we may consider an MCS M as a special PMCS (M, ∅),
which contains only one stratum, i.e., 〈M〉.
Essentially, preferential multi-context systems take into account the impact
of preference relation over contexts on inter-contextual information exchange.
Only information flow from a context to equally or less preferred ones are allowed
to occur in preferential multi-context systems.
Let (M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉 be an PMCS. Then the i-cut of (M,≤s)
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, denoted M(i), is defined as M(k) =
i⋃
k=1
Mk. Correspond-
ingly, we call M1→i = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mi〉 the i-section of (M,≤s). Note that
the compatibility of M and ≤s ensures that each i-section of (M,≤s) is also an
PMCS. Correspondingly, each i-cut of (M,≤s) is an MCS. Informally speak-
ing, given an PMCS, the i-section is exactly the PMCS consisting of the first
i strata in (M,≤s), in which all the contexts are preferred to ones in Mi+1 for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1. This implies that the i-section of an PMCS exactly capture
the inter-contextual information exchange between contexts preferred to ones
in Mi+1.
A belief state for 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉 is a sequence S = 〈S1,S2, · · · ,Sm〉
such that S1 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Si is a belief state of M(i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where ⊎ is a
concatenation operator. In particular, we use ⊎S to denote S1 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Sm.
Definition 3.3 A belief state S = 〈S1,S2, · · · ,Sm〉 of (M,≤s) is an equilibrium
of (M,≤s) iff ⊎S is an equilibrium of M .
Example 3.1 Consider an PMCS (M2,≤s) = 〈(C1, C2), (C3), (C4, C5)〉, where
L1 and L2 are propositional logics, and others are ASP logics. Suppose that
• kb1 = {a}, br1 = {r11 = (1 : c)← (2 : b)};
• kb2 = {b}, br2 = {r21 = (2 : d)← (1 : a)};
• kb3 = {e ← f}, br3 = {r31 = (3 : f) ← (1 : c), r32 = (3 : d) ← not (2 :
b)};
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• kb4 = {g ← h, h← g}, br4 = {r41 = (4 : h)← (1 : a), (3 : f)};
• kb5 = {p←}, br5 = {r51 = (5 : q)← (2 : d), (3 : f),not (4 : ¬h)}.
Consider S = 〈({a, c}, {b, d}), ({e, f}), ({h, g}, {p, q})〉. Then all bridge rules
are applicable in S except r32. Moreover, it is easy to check that S is an equi-
librium of (M2,≤s).
stratum 3: (C4, C5)
C4 C5✲
stratum 2: (C3)
C3
stratum 1: (C1, C2)
C1 C2✲✛
❄ ❄✠ ❘
❘ ✠
Figure 1: Information flow in (M2,≤s)
On the other hand, we can use a directed graph G = (V,E) to illustrate the
information flow in a (preferential) multi-context system M = (C1, · · · , Cn),
where V = {C1, · · · , Cn}, and 〈Ci, Cj〉 ∈ E if ∃r ∈ brj s.t. Ci ∈ cnt(r). For
example, the information flow in (M2,≤s) is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that
in such an information flow graph, there is at most one edge between any two
contexts belonging to different strata, moreover, such an edge must be from a
preferred context to another context.
As mentioned in [5], inter-contextual information exchange among decentral-
ized and heterogeneous contexts can cause an MCS to be inconsistent. Moreover,
inconsistency in an MCS renders the system useless. However, in the case of
preferential multi-context systems, inconsistency may not be considered as a to-
tally undesirable. Allowing for preferences on contexts, we are more interested
in some consistent sections of an inconsistent PMCS, which are significant in
some applications. To address this issue, we generalize the notion of equilibrium
to an l≤-equilibrium for an PMCS as follows.
Definition 3.4 (l≤-equilibrium) Given an PMCS (M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉
and a number l ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. A belief state S = 〈S1,S2 · · · ,Sm〉 of (M,≤s) is
an l≤-equilibrium of (M,≤s) iff 〈S1,S2 · · · ,Sl〉 is an equilibrium of the l-section
M1→l of (M,≤s).
Roughly speaking, an l≤-equilibrium of a preferential multi-context system
represents belief sets acceptable for at least all the contexts in the first l strata
of (M,≤s), given the belief sets for other contexts. Note that an l≤-equilibrium
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of (M,≤s) must be an k≤-equilibrium for all k ≤ l. In particular, an equilibrium
of (M,≤s) is an l≤-equilibrium of (M,≤s) for all 1 ≤ l ≤ m. But it does not
hold vice versa.
Definition 3.5 (l<-equilibrium) Given an PMCS (M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉
and a number l ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. A belief state S = 〈S1,S2 · · · ,Sm〉 of (M,≤s)
is called an l<-equilibrium of (M,≤s) iff
• S is an l≤-equilibrium of (M,≤s),
• but S is not an (l + 1)≤-equilibrium of (M,≤s) if l+ 1 ≤ m.
Essentially, an l<-equilibrium of a preferential multi-context system (M,≤s
) represents belief sets acceptable for all the contexts in the first l strata of
(M,≤s), but not for at least one context in the (l + 1)-stratum if l < m, given
the belief sets for other contexts. Evidently, any equilibrium of (M,≤s) is an
m<-equilibrium according to this definition.
Definition 3.6 (Maximal l<-equilibrium) Given an PMCS (M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉
and a number l ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. A belief state S = 〈S1,S2 · · · ,Sm〉 of (M,≤s)
is called a maximal l<-equilibrium of (M,≤s) iff
• S is an l<-equilibrium of (M,≤s),
• For any i<-equilibrium S ′ of (M,≤s), i ≤ l.
Actually, a maximal l<-equilibrium of a preferential multi-context system
is indeed an equilibrium of that system if that system is consistent, otherwise,
it represents belief sets acceptable for contexts in a section which cannot keep
consistent if we add the next stratum to it.
Example 3.2 Consider an PMCS
(M3,≤s) = 〈(C1, C2), (C3, C4), (C5), (C6)〉,
where L1, L2, and L6 are propositional logics, and others are ASP logics. Sup-
pose that
• kb1 = {a}, br1 = {r11 = (1 : c)← (2 : b)};
• kb2 = {b}, br2 = {r21 = (2 : d)← (1 : a)};
• kb3 = {e← f}, br3 = {r31 = (3 : f)← (1 : c)};
• kb4 = {g ← h, h← g}, br4 = {r41 = (4 : h)← (2 : d),not (1 : b)};
• kb5 = {m ←,⊥ ← q,not p}, br5 = {r51 = (5 : q) ← (3 : f); r52 = (5 :
p)← not (2 : b);}
• kb6 = {¬r}, br6 = {r61 = (6 : r)← (4 : h)}.
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Evidently, all bridge rules are applicable except r52. Moreover, applying r11,
r31, and r51 in turn adds q to C5, and then activates ⊥ ← q,not p. On the
other hand, applying r21, r41, and r61 in turn adds r to C6, and then results
in both r and ¬r occurring in C6. So, (M3,≤s) has no equilibrium, i.e., M3 |=
⊥. Moreover, it also implies that its 3-section also has no equilibrium, i.e.,
〈(C1, C2), (C3, C4), (C5)〉 |= ⊥.
However, both the 1-section and 2-section of (M3,≤s) are consistent. Obvi-
ously, we can check
• S0 = 〈({a, c}, {b, d}), ({e}, {h}), ({m, q}), ({r})〉 is an 1≤-equilibrium, but
not an 2≤-equilibrium; So, it is an 1<-equilibrium.
• S1 = 〈({a, c}, {b, d}), ({e, f}, {g, h}), ({m, q}), ({r})〉 is an 2<-equilibrium;
• S1 is a maximal 2<-equilibrium of (M3,≤s).
An occurrence of inconsistency in a multi-context system makes that system
useless. However, considering preferences in preferential multi-context systems
makes things better. The section corresponding to a maximal l<-equilibrium
may be interesting and useful in the presence of inconsistency, because it fully
captures the meaningful information exchange among contexts involved in this
section.
4 Inconsistency Analysis
Now an interesting question arises: how to measure the degree of inconsistency
for an PMCS? Note that the value l + 1 points out the stratum where we first
meet inconsistency if a given inconsistent PMCS (M,≤s) has a maximal l<-
equilibrium. In particular, if we abuse the notation and say that (M,≤s) has
a maximal 0<-equilibrium if it has no maximal l<-equilibrium for any given
1 ≤ l ≤ m. Then l+1 is exactly the inconsistency rank for stratified knowledge
bases presented in [1, 2] in essence. To bear this in mind, we present the following
inconsistency measure.
Definition 4.1 Given an PMCS (M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉. The degree of
inconsistency of (M,≤s), denoted DI((M,≤s)), is defined as
DI((M,≤s)) = 1−
l
m
,
if (M,≤s) has the maximal l<-equilibrium, where 0 ≤ l ≤ m.
Actually, the degree of inconsistency DI((M,≤s)) of (M,≤s) is a slight adap-
tation of the inconsistency rank such that
• 0 ≤ DI((M,≤s)) ≤ 1;
• DI((M,≤s)) = 0 iff (M,≤s) is consistent;
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• DI((M,≤s)) = 1 iff M1 |= ⊥.
Note that the first two properties are called Normalization and Consistency,
respectively [12]. The third property says that an PMCS has the upper bound
1 iff there is no consistent section.
Example 4.1 Consider (M3,≤s) again. Note that
DI((M3,≤s)) = 1−
2
4
=
1
2
,
because it has an maximal 2<-equilibrium as illustrated above.
The measure DI((M,≤s)) allows us to have a sketchy picture on the incon-
sistency in (M,≤s). In many applications, we need to find more information
about the inconsistency. For example, we need to know which contexts and
bridge rules of a given PMCS are involved in the inconsistency in order to re-
store consistency of the PMCS.
Note that any two contexts are considered equally preferred in inconsistency
handling in the case of multi-context systems. However, preferences over con-
texts play an important role in dealing with inconsistency among these contexts,
especially in making some tradeoff decisions on resolving inconsistency when
we take into account preferences. Generally, the more preferred contexts are
considered more reliable when an inconsistency occurs in a preferential multi-
context system, moreover, remaining unchanged is preferred to any action of
revision for such contexts. For example, in requirements engineering, when two
requirements with different priority levels contradict each other, a less preferred
requirement will be revised to accommodate itself to another one in most cases.
Given an PMCS, each section actually splits the whole set of contexts into
two parts, i.e., itself and a set of other strictly less preferred contexts. More-
over, each consistent section fully captures information exchange among con-
texts which are strictly preferred to ones not included in that section. Generally,
such a section may be considered as one of plausible parts of that PMCS. Al-
lowing for this, we are more interested in a section that contains more preferred
strata as much as possible. Moreover, any changes of bridge rules for restoring
consistency should not affect information exchange among contexts in such a
section. In this sense, identifying a consistent section with the maximal num-
ber of strata is central to inconsistency analysis in a preferential multi-context
system.
Definition 4.2 (Maximal consistent section) Given an PMCS (M,≤s) =
〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉, the i-section M1→i of (M,≤s), is called a maximal consis-
tent section of (M,≤s), if
• M1→i 6|= ⊥;
• M1→k |= ⊥ for all k > i.
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Informally speaking, the maximal consistent section of an PMCS can be
considered as a reliable part of that PMCS. We use M1→kmc to denote the
maximal consistent section of (M,≤s). Evidently, given an inconsistent PMCS
(M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉, a maximal l<-equilibrium of (M,≤s) is exactly
an equilibrium of the l-section M1→l, because less preferred contexts cannot
bring new information to more preferred contexts in an PMCS. This implies
that finding the maximal consistent section may be not harder than finding
maximal l<-equilibrium.
Example 4.2 Consider (M3,≤s) again. The 2-section 〈(C1, C2), (C3, C4)〉 is
its maximal consistent section.
As mentioned above, Eiter et al have proposed diagnoses and inconsistency
explanations for a multi-context system. We use the following example to
demonstrate what will happen when we apply these to a preferential multi-
context system.
Example 4.3 Consider (M3,≤s) again. Note that all of the following sets of
rules are ⊆-minimal s-diagnoses of (M3,≤s):
• D1 = {r51, r61}, D2 = {r51, r41},D3 = {r51, r21};
• D4 = {r31, r61}, D5 = {r31, r41}, D6 = {r31, r21};
• D7 = {r11, r61}, D8 = {r11, r41}, D9 = {r11, r21}.
Note that all of the ⊆-minimal s-diagnoses contains one bridge rule of maximal
consistent section except D1. That is, according to Di for all i ≥ 2, we need
to deactivate some information exchange in maximal consistent section to re-
store consistency in (M3,≤s). In contrast, D1 leaves information exchange in
maximal consistent section unchanged. Allowing for preferences relation over
contexts, D1 is more significant for inconsistency handling in (M3,≤s).
The example above illustrates that diagnoses not involving maximal con-
sistent section in inconsistency are more preferred. Allowing for the duality
relation between diagnoses and explanations, we have the same opinion on in-
consistency explanations. However, the compatibility to more preferred knowl-
edge is considered as one of useful strategies in preferential knowledge revision
and integration [1, 2]. Next we adapt diagnoses and inconsistency explanations
to accommodate maximal consistent section, respectively.
Definition 4.3 Given an PMCS (M,≤s), a diagnosis (D1, D2) of M is com-
patible to the maximal consistent section of (M,≤s) if (D1∪D2)∩brM(kmc) = ∅.
Note that if we focus on the maximal consistent section of a preferential
multi-context system, then the set brM \ brM(kmc) of bridge rules of all contexts
out of the section exactly composes a diagnosis (brM \ brM(kmc), ∅) of inconsis-
tency for that system, because M [brM(kmc)] 6|= ⊥. This guarantees that there
exists at least one diagnosis compatible with the maximal consistent section.
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Example 4.4 Consider (M3,≤s) again. All of ({r51, r61, r52}, ∅), ({r51, r61}, ∅)
and ({r61}, {r52}) are diagnoses compatible to the maximal consistent section.
Furthermore, we consider minimal diagnoses compatible with the maximal
consistent section of a given PMCS.
Definition 4.4 (c-diagnosis) Given an PMCS (M,≤s), an s-diagnosis D of
M , is called an c-diagnosis of (M,≤s), if D ∈ D−m(M) and D ∩ brM(kmc) = ∅.
The set of all c-diagnosis of (M,≤s) is D−c ((M,≤s)).
Essentially, an c-diagnosis D of (M,≤s) is an ⊆-minimal s-diagnosis that is
compatible with the maximal consistent section of (M,≤s), i.e., none of bridge
rules of the maximal consistent section of (M,≤s) is involved in D .
Example 4.5 Consider (M3,≤s) again. Then D1 = {r51, r61} is a unique c-
diagnosis compatible to the maximal consistent section, i.e., D−c ((M3,≤s)) =
{D1}.
Note that for allD ∈ D−c ((M,≤s)), D ∈ D
−
m((M,≤s)) andD∩brM(kmc) = ∅.
So,
⋃
D−c ((M,≤s)) ⊆
⋃
D−m((M,≤s)) \ brM(kmc), but not vice versa.
Definition 4.5 (c-inconsistency explanation) Given an PMCS (M,≤s), an
c-inconsistency explanation E of (M,≤s), is a set E ⊆ brM s.t. each E ⊆ R ⊆
brM \ brM(kmc), satisfies M [brM(kmc) ∪ R] |= ⊥. The set of all ⊆-minimal c-
inconsistency explanations of (M,≤s) is E+c ((M,≤s)).
Essentially, an c-inconsistency explanation focuses on the set of other bridges
rules need to cause an inconsistency given a set of bridge rules of the maximal
consistent section. Both c-inconsistency explanations and c-diagnoses capture
the inconsistency under an assumption that every bridge rule of the maximal
consistent section should not be revised or modified to restore consistency.
Example 4.6 Consider (M3,≤s) again. Then both E1 = {r51} and E2 =
{r61} are ⊆-minimal c-inconsistency explanations compatible to the maximal
consistent section, moreover, E+c ((M3,≤s)) = {E1, E2}.
More interestingly, we have the following weak duality relation between c-
diagnoses and c-inconsistency explanations.
Proposition 4.1 Given an inconsistent PMCS (M,≤s), then
⋃
E+c ((M,≤s)) =
⋃
D−c ((M,≤s)).
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Proof This is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.1 in essence. The main part
of this proof is the same as that of Theorem 2.1 provided in [8].
Let (M,≤s) be an PMCS and M1→kmc its maximal consistent section. The
complement of R w.r.t. brM is denoted as R = brM \R.
We first prove that
⋃
E+c ((M,≤s)) ⊇
⋃
D−c ((M,≤s)) holds. Let D ∈
D−c ((M,≤s)), then brM(kmc) ⊆ D. We show that there exists E ∈ E
+
c with
x ∈ E, for x ∈ D.
Consider E˜ = D \ {x}, then brM(kmc) ⊂ E˜ and M [E˜] |= ⊥. Let E =
E˜ \ brM(kmc). Then for all E ⊆ R ⊆ brM(kmc), M [brM(kmc) ∪R] |= ⊥.
Suppose that there exists E′ ⊆ E with x 6∈ E′ and E′ ∈ E+c . Then E
′ ⊂ E,
and brM(kmc) ∪ E
′ ⊆ D, then M [brM(kmc) ∪E
′] 6|= ⊥. So, E′ 6∈ E+c .
Then we prove that
⋃
E+c ((M,≤s)) ⊆
⋃
D−c ((M,≤s)) holds. Let E ∈
E+c ((M,≤s)), then E ∩ brM(kmc) = ∅. We show that there exists D ∈ D
−
c
with x ∈ D, for x ∈ E.
Consider S = {R \ {x}|E ⊆ R ⊆ brM(kmc)}. Let S
′ = {T ∈ S|M [brMkmc ∪
T ] 6|= ⊥}. Assume that S′ = ∅, thenM [brMkmc ∪E\{x}] |= ⊥, which contradicts
E ∈ E+c ((M,≤s)). So, S
′ 6= ∅
Let T1 be a⊆-minimal set in S′ s.t. M [brMkmc∪T1] 6|= ⊥. Then brM(kmc) ∪ T1 ∈
D−c (M), since for all brM(kmc) ∪ T1 ⊂ R, M [R] |= ⊥.
Furthermore, x 6∈ brM(kmc) ∪ T1, then x ∈ brM(kmc) ∪ T1. 
This weak duality shows that if we consider bridge rules in the maximal con-
sistent section as reliable ones, then diagnoses and inconsistency explanations
compatible with maximal consistent section represent dual aspects of inconsis-
tency caused by bridge rules out of the maximal consistent section.
5 Computational Complexity
In this section we are concerned with the complexity aspects of preferential
multi-context systems. We assume that the reader is familiar with the classes
P , NP , and coNP as well as polynomial time hierarchy (∆p0 = Σ
p
0 = Π
p
0 = P ;
and for all k ≥ 0, ∆pi+1 = P
Σp
i ,Σpi+1 = NP
Σp
i ,Πpi+1 = coNP
Σp
i ) [16]. We now
introduce the following classes:
• Dpi = 〈Σ
p
i ,Π
p
i 〉 is the class of all languages such that L = L1 ∩ L2, where
L1 is in Σ
p
i and L2 is in Π
p
i for all i ≥ 1. In particular, D
p
1 is the class
of all languages such that L = L1 ∩ L2, where L1 is in NP and L2 is in
coNP . The well known problem of SAT-UNSAT is one of the canonical
D
p
1-complete problems.
• More generally, let X1 and X2 be two complexity classes, then 〈X1, X2〉
is the class of all languages such that L = L1 ∩L2, where L1 is in X1 and
L2 is in X2.
• Let X be a complexity class, PX (resp. NPX) is the class of all languages
that can be recognized in polynomial time by a (resp. nondeterministic)
Turing machine equipped with an X oracle, where an X oracle solves
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whatever instance of a problem in X class in unit time. In particular,
PD
p
k
[logn] is the class of all languages can be recognized in polynomial
time by a Turing machine using a number of Dpk oracles bounded by a
logarithmic function of the size of input data.
• FX is the corresponding class of functions of X .
At first, we recall the complexity of calculating equilibria by guessing so-
called kernels of context belief sets presented in [4], and then we discuss the com-
putational complexity for calculating l≤-equilibria for preferential multi-context
systems based on that complexity result. Following this, we discuss complex-
ity aspects for identifying diagnoses and inconsistency explanations compatible
with the maximal consistent section.
5.1 Complexity for equilibria
We consider the following aspects of computational complexity about finding
equilibria for preferential multi-context systems:
• Consistency checking: the problem of deciding whether an PMCS (M,≤s)
has an equilibrium.
• l-consistency checking: the problem of deciding whether an PMCS (M,≤s
) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉 has an l≤-equilibrium for a given 1 ≤ l ≤ m.
• maximal l-consistency: the problem of deciding whether an PMCS (M,≤s
) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉 has a maximal l<-equilibrium for a given l.
• maximal l<-equilibrium: the problem of computing l for an PMCS (M,≤s
) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉 such that it has a maximal l<-equilibrium.
Note that the core of these problems is to check consistency of some sections
or a whole preferential multi-context systems in essences. However, the com-
plexity aspects of calculating equilibria by guessing so-called kernels of context
belief sets has been investigated in [4]. In this paper, we also adopt the follow-
ing assumption of poly-size kernels about logics used in multi-context systems
presented in [4]. A logic L has poly-size kernels, if there is a mapping κ which
assigns to every kb ∈ KB and S ∈ ACC(KB) a set κ(kb, S) ⊆ S of size (written
as a string) polynomial in the size of kb, called the kernel of S, such that there
is a one-to-one correspondence f between the belief sets in ACC(kb) and their
kernels, i.e., S ⇋ f(κ(kb, S)) [4]. Moreover, L has kernel reasoning in ∆pk if
given any knowledge base kb, an element b, and a set of elements K, deciding
whether (i) K = κ(kb, S) for some S ∈ ACC(kb) and (ii) b ∈ S is in ∆pk [4].
Brewka et al have pointed out that standard propositional non-monotonic
logics such as DL, AEL, and NLP have poly-size kernels, moreover, the standard
propositional non-monotonic reasoning formalisms DL and AEL have kernel
reasoning in ∆p2 [4].
Furthermore, for convenience, we assume that any belief set S in any logic L
contains a distinguished element true; then for b = true, (i) and (ii) together
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are equivalent to (i), i.e., whether K is a kernel for some acceptable belief set
of kb [4].
Now we introduce the following theorem about computational complexity
about consistency checking for multi-context systems based on assumptions
above presented in [4].
Theorem 5.1 [4] Given a finite MCS M = (C1, C2, · · · , Cn) where all logics
Li have poly-size kernels and kernel reasoning in ∆
p
k, deciding whether M has
an equilibrium is in Σpk+1.
Then we can get the following corollary about consistency checking and
proposition about l-consistency checking for preferential multi-context systems
directly from the theorem above, respectively.
Corollary 5.1 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉 where all
logics Li have poly-size kernels and kernel reasoning in ∆
p
k, deciding whether
(M,≤s) has an equilibrium is in Σ
p
k+1.
Proof Note that (M,≤s) has an equilibrium if and only if M has an equilib-
rium. According to Theorem 5.1, the problem of deciding whether (M,≤s) has
an equilibrium is in Σpk+1. 
Proposition 5.1 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉 where
all logics Li have poly-size kernels and kernel reasoning in ∆
p
k, deciding whether
(M,≤s) has an l≤-equilibrium for a given 1 ≤ l ≤ m is in Σ
p
k+1.
Proof Given a number 1 ≤ l ≤ m, (M,≤s) has an l≤-equilibrium if and only
if M(l) has an equilibrium. According to Theorem 5.1, the problem of deciding
whether (M,≤s) has an l≤-equilibrium is in Σ
p
k+1. 
Next we give the complexity of maximal l-consistency problem for preferen-
tial multi-context systems in the case of given a positive number l.
Proposition 5.2 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s) = 〈M1,M2, · · · ,Mm〉 where
all logics Li have poly-size kernels and kernel reasoning in ∆
p
k, the problem of
deciding whether (M,≤s) has a maximal l<-equilibrium for a given l < m is in
D
p
k+1.
Proof Note that (M,≤s) has a maximal l<-equilibrium for a given l < m if
and only if M(l) has at least one equilibrium and M(l+ 1) has no equilibrium.
Recall the problem of deciding whether M has an equilibrium is in Σpk+1, so,
the problem of deciding whether M has no equilibrium is in Πpk+1. Then the
problem of deciding whether (M,≤s) has a maximal l<-equilibrium for a given
l < m is in 〈Σpk+1,Π
p
k+1〉, i.e., D
p
k+1. 
Then we are ready to get the following computational complexity for the
problem of maximal l<-equilibrium.
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Proposition 5.3 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s) where all logics Li have poly-
size kernels and kernel reasoning in ∆pk, the problem of computing l for (M,≤s)
such that it has maximal l<-equilibrium is in FP
D
p
k+1
[logn].
proof Consider the following algorithm for computing l:
(1) if M 6|= ⊥, then l = m;
(2) else if M(1) |= ⊥, then l = 0;
(3) else for i from 1 to n − 1, if (M,≤s) has an i<-equilibrium, then l = i,
break; else i = i + 1.
According to Corollary 5.1, the problem of deciding whether M 6|= ⊥ is in
Σpk+1, and checking whether M(1) |= ⊥ is in Π
p
k+1.
From Proposition 5.2, we have obtained that the problem of deciding
whether (M,≤s) has a maximal i<-equilibrium for each i is in D
p
k+1. Therefore,
l can be computed in polynomial time by a Turing machine equipped with an
D
p
k+1 oracle. So, the problem of computing l is in FP
D
p
k+1 .
Further, consider two particular singleton multi-contexts systemsM1 = (C1)
andM2 = (C2), where both L1 and L2 are propositional logics with kb1 = kb2 =
{}, br1 = {(1 : a)← not (1 : a)} and br2 = {(2 : a)←}. Then
• l = m if and only if 〈M 6|= ⊥,M1 |= ⊥〉 holds.
• l = 0 if and only if 〈M2 6|= ⊥,M(1) |= ⊥〉 holds.
Moreover, we can use a binary search on {1, 2, · · · ,m− 1} to find l at step (3).
Under such a case, l can be computed by using O(log2m) calls to an D
k+1
p
oracle. So, the problem of computing l is also in FPD
p
k+1
[logn]. 
Note that M1→l is the maximal consistent section if and only if (M,≤s) has
a maximal l<-equilibrium. Then from Proposition 5.3, we can get the following
complexity for the problem of identifying the maximal consistent section of
(M,≤s) directly.
Corollary 5.2 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s) where all logics Li have poly-
size kernels and kernel reasoning in ∆pk, the problem of identifying the maximal
consistent section of (M,≤s) is in FP
D
p
k+1
[logn].
We summarize these complexity aspects in Table 1.
5.2 Computational complexity for diagnoses and explana-
tions
We focus on diagnoses and inconsistency explanations compatible with the max-
imal consistent section in a preferential multi-context system, respectively.
At first, we consider the following complexity aspects about diagnoses and
inconsistency explanations in the case that the maximal consistent section is
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Table 1: Complexity aspects about equilibrium
Problem Complexity
consistency Σpk+1
l-consistency Σpk+1
maximal l-consistency D
p
k+1
maximal l<-equilibrium FP
Dk+1p [logn]
given. Note that the complexity aspects about finding diagnoses and incon-
sistency explanations for multi-context systems have been investigated in [8],
respectively. The following proposition shows that problems of finding diag-
noses (resp. inconsistency explanations) compatible with the maximal consis-
tent section have the same complexity with that of finding diagnoses (resp.
inconsistency explanations) when the maximal consistent section is given.
Proposition 5.4 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s) and its maximal consistent sec-
tion M1→kmc , deciding whether D ⊆ brM is a diagnosis compatible with M1→kmc
has the same computational complexity as consistency checking of (M,≤s).
Proof Note that we only need to check whether M [brM \ D] 6|= ⊥ and D ∩
brM(kmc) = ∅. 
Proposition 5.5 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s) and its maximal consistent sec-
tion M1→kmc , deciding whether D ⊆ brM is an c-diagnosis has the same com-
putational complexity as minimal diagnosis recognition of M .
Proof Note that the problem of deciding whetherD is an c-diagnosis of (M,≤s
) is equivalent to deciding whether D is a minimal s-diagnosis of (M,≤s) and
D ∩ brM(kmc) = ∅. 
Proposition 5.6 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s) and its maximal consistent sec-
tion M1→kmc , deciding whether E ⊆ brM is an c-inconsistency explanation has
the same computational complexity as inconsistency explanation recognition of
M .
Proof Note that the problem of deciding whether E is an c-inconsistency
explanation of (M,≤s) is equivalent to deciding whether E is an inconsistency
explanation of (M,≤s) and E ∩ brM(kmc) = ∅. 
Now we consider the general case of finding c-diagnoses and c-inconsistency
explanations for preferential multi-context systems. Let Cms(M) be the com-
plexity for identifying the maximal consistent section of (M,≤s). For example,
Cms(M) is P
D
p
k+1
[logn] in the case illustrated in Proposition 5.3. Let Csd(M,D)
be the complexity for deciding whether D ⊆ brM is an s-diagnosis of M . Let
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Ce(M,E) is the complexity for deciding whether E is an inconsistency expla-
nation of M . We assume that Ce(M,E) is closed under conjunction, according
to discussion about such complexity aspects in [8].
Proposition 5.7 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s), deciding whether D ⊆ brM is
an c-diagnosis is in 〈Cms(M),Csd(M,D)〉.
Proof To decide whether D ⊆ brM is an c-diagnosis, we need to check
(1) whether D ∩ brM(kmc) = ∅ holds;
(2) whether D is an s-diagnosis.
Note that D ∩ brM(kmc) = ∅ if and only if brM(kmc) ⊆ D. Then (1) is
equal to finding the maximal consistent section from sections not involved in
D. So, the problem of deciding whether D ⊆ brM is an c-diagnosis is in
〈Cms(M),Csd(M,D)〉. 
Proposition 5.8 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s), deciding whether E ⊆ brM
is an c-inconsistency explanation is in 〈Cms(M),Ce(M,E)〉, where Ce(M,E) is
the complexity for deciding whether E is an inconsistency explanation of M .
Proof To decide whether E ⊆ brM is an c-inconsistency explanation, we need
to check
(1) whether E ∩ brM(kmc) = ∅ holds;
(2) whether E is an inconsistency explanation.
Note that (1) is equal to finding the maximal consistent section from sections
not involved in E. So, the problem of deciding whether E ⊆ brM is an c-
inconsistency explanation is in 〈Cms(M),Ce(M,E)〉. 
Proposition 5.9 Given a finite PMCS (M,≤s), deciding whether E ⊆ brM is
in E+c ((M,≤s)) is in 〈〈Cms(M),Ce(M,E)〉, coCe(M,E)〉.
Proof Note that E ∈ E+c ((M,≤s)) if and only if E is an c-inconsistency ex-
planation and E is minimal w.r.t. ⊆. We have obtained that deciding whether
E ⊆ brM is an c-inconsistency explanation is in 〈Cms(M),Ce(M,E)〉 in Propo-
sition 5.8.
From Lemma 2 in [8], we can check subset-minimality of E by deciding
whether none of E \{x} is an inconsistency explanation for all x ∈ E. Note that
the number of these checks is linear w.r.t. |E|, and Ce(M,E) is closed under con-
junction. So, deciding whether E ∈ E+c ((M,≤s)) is in 〈〈Cms(M),Ce(M,E)〉, coCe(M,E)〉.

Note that we consider the general case of complexity. It is not difficult to
consider the usual cases discussed in [8].
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6 Comparison and Discussion
Preferential multi-context systems provide a framework for incorporating pref-
erences on contexts in multi-context systems. However, the following aspects
distinguish preferential multi-context systems from the original multi-context
systems presented in [4]. At first, the compatibility of a total preorder relation
over contexts with a multi-context system imposes a constraint on bridge rules,
i.e., any appearance of less preferred contexts is prohibited in the body of a
bridge rule for a given context. Only one-way information flow between any two
strata is allowed to occur in a preferential multi-context system. The intuition
behind this constraint is that less reliable information cannot be used to revise
more reliable knowledge. Second, one-way information flow makes any section
of a preferential multi-context system capable of capturing all the information
exchange among contexts in that section. This signifies that each section is
also a meaningful preferential multi-context system. Third, preferential multi-
context systems are concerned with partial equilibria such as l≤-equilibria as
well as equilibria.
Note that preferential multi-context systems also analyze inconsistency in
terms of diagnoses and inconsistency explanations presented in [8]. However,
allowing for the role of preferences on contexts in a given preferential multi-
context system, we are more interested in diagnoses and inconsistency expla-
nations compatible with the maximal consistent section. More interestingly,
diagnoses and inconsistency explanations compatible with the maximal consis-
tent section have duality relation. This implies that the compatibility with
the maximal consistent section does not destroy the duality relation between
diagnoses and inconsistency explanations [8].
Actually, the compatibility of diagnoses (resp. inconsistency explanations)
with the maximal consistent section essentially provides a way to discriminate
between all diagnoses (resp. inconsistency explanation) based on preferences on
contexts. In this sense, such a compatibility can be considered as some kind
of filter to filter some undesirable diagnoses (resp. inconsistency explanations)
[9].
Preferential multi-context systems aim to address the total preorder relation
over contexts. However, combining preferences with contexts is one of the im-
portant issues in integrating and sharing contextual knowledge [3]. Moreover, as
stated in [6], there is a multifaceted relationship between nonmonotonic logics
and preferences. As a framework for integrating arbitrary monotonic and non-
monotonic logics, it is necessary to incorporating such a relation in multi-context
systems. This may be one of directions of our future work.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the preferential multi-context system, which
provides a promising framework for combining multi-context systems with the
total preorder relations on their contexts. Preferential multi-context systems
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take into account the impact of preferences among contexts on their inter-
contextual information exchange. Only information flow from more preferred
contexts to less preferred ones is allowed to occur in preferential multi-context
systems. In such a preferential multi-context system, a context may be revised
based on only information exchange with more or equally preferred contexts.
This paper presented the following contributions to multi-context systems
community:
• We proposed the notion of preferential multi-context system, which con-
sists of a multi-context system with a total preorder relation compatible
with that system.
• We extended the equilibrium semantics for multi-context systems and pro-
posed a notion of l≤-equilibrium representing belief states acceptable for
at least contexts of the first l strata in a preferential multi-context system.
Furthermore, we proposed a notion of maximal l<-equilibrium describing
belief states acceptable for contexts in the maximal consistent section of
a preferential multi-context system.
• We proposed inconsistency diagnoses and inconsistency explanations com-
patible with the maximal consistent section, respectively. Moreover, we
discussed their duality relation.
• We investigated the computational complexity aspects for calculating l≤-
equilibria and identifying diagnoses and inconsistency explanations com-
patible with the maximal consistent section, respectively.
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